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Abstract
In this paper we study the extent to which ethical social welfare
orders on inﬁnite utility streams can be continuous. For a class of
metrics, we show that ethical preferences can be continuous if and only
if the continuity requirement is in terms of a metric which satisﬁes a
simplex condition. This condition requires that the distance from the
origin to the unit simplex in the space of utility streams be positive.
We use this characterization result to establish that the metric used
by Svensson (1980) induces the weakest topology for which there exist
continuous ethical preferences.
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11 Introduction
In comparing social states which are speciﬁed by inﬁnite utility streams,
there are two widely accepted guiding principles. The equal treatment of
all generations, proposed by Ramsey (1928), is formalized in the Anonymity
Axiom. The positive sensitivity of the social preference structure to the well-
being of each generation is reﬂected in the Pareto Axiom. A social welfare
ordering (a binary relation on the social states, satisfying completeness and
transitivity) satisfying both axioms is said to reﬂect ethical preferences.
Diamond (1965) showed that any social welfare ordering for which the
lower contour set of each state is closed in the sup metric (a weak continuity
requirement) cannot satisfy the Anonymity and Pareto Axioms simultane-
ously.1
Since the continuity requirement is a technical restriction, this result
raises the question whether there exists any social welfare ordering respecting
the Anonymity and Pareto axioms. Svensson (1980) was the ﬁrst to show
that such an ordering does exist.
Taken together, the impossibility result of Diamond and the possibility
result of Svensson form the basis for all subsequent research on this topic2.
They naturally lead us to enquire, loosely speaking, how much continuity of
a social welfare ordering brings the Anonymity and Pareto axioms in conﬂict
with each other. Formally, one would like to identify the weakest topology
on the space of inﬁnite utility streams under which ethical preferences can
be continuous.
Svensson (1980) raised this question (p.1254, lines 14-15), and while he
did not provide a complete answer to it, he did construct a social welfare
ordering, satisfying the Anonymity and Pareto axioms, whichs a t i s ﬁ e sc o n t i -
nuity in a metric, which is based on the  1 norm (called a bounded  1 metric
in what follows). Although several attempts have been made at studying
continuity in this setting, there is stilln os a t i s f a c t o r ya n s w e rt oS v e n s s o n ’ s
question. Lauwers (1997) and Shinotsuka (1998) have analyzed the impli-
cations, for the existence of ethical preferences, of imposing continuity with
respect to speciﬁc metrics. Sakai (2004) has addressed the issue of restricting
1Actually, the statement of Diamond’s result (p.176, lines 19-21, which he attributes
to Yaari) is weaker, since he imposes continuity of the social welfare ordering in the sup
metric. However, the proof clearly shows that the stronger result stated here is valid.
2See, among others, Campbell (1985), Fleurbaey and Michel (2003), Lauwers (1997),
Shinotsuka (1998) and Sakai (2003, 2004).
2the domain of preferences to escape the Diamond impossibility theorem. He
ﬁnds that, if one ﬁxes sup-norm continuity as the “natural” continuity axiom,
the existence of ethical preferences implies a domain with empty interior in
the sup metric.
In this paper we address Svensson’s question in the framework used by Di-
amond (1965)3. For a class of metrics (which is general enough to accommo-
date most of the commonly used metrics in this literature) we identify a (sim-
plex) condition that completely characterizes the possibility-impossibility di-
vide. Speciﬁcally, we show that a social welfare order can simultaneously
satisfy the Anonymity, Pareto and Continuity axioms if and only if one im-
poses the continuity requirement in terms of a metric, such that the distance
from zero to the unit simplex in X (the space of utility streams) is positive.
In other words, in order for ethical preferences to be continuous, utility se-
quences lying in the unit simplex of X (and therefore bounded away from
zero in the metric generated by the  1 norm) must also be bounded away from
zero in the metric in terms of which the continuity requirement is imposed.
We use our characterization result to show that for our class of metrics,
the bounded  1 metric used by Svensson induces the weakest topology under
which there exists a social welfare ordering satisfying the Anonymity, Pareto
and Continuity axioms simultaneously. This settles a long-standing open
question in this literature.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation and Deﬁnitions
Let N denote, as usual, the set of natural numbers {1,2,3,...}, and let R
denote the set of real numbers. Let Y denote the closed interval [0,1] ,
and let X denote the set Y N. Then, X is the domain of utility sequences
(also, referred to as “utility streams”) that we are interested in. Hence,
x ≡ (x1,x 2,...) ∈ X if and only if xn ∈ [0,1] for all n ∈ N. The sequence
(0,0,0,...) ∈ X will be denoted by 0, and the sequence (1,1,1,...) will be
denoted by e.
For x ∈ X,and N ∈ N, we denote (x1,...,xN) by x(N) and (xN+1,x N+2,...)
3In his framework, the utility levels possible in any period belong to the interval Y =
[0,1], and the social welfare order is deﬁned on X = Y N, the space of inﬁnite utility
streams.
3by x[N]. Thus, given any x ∈ X and N ∈ N, we can write x =( x(N),x[N]).
If x,y ∈ X, and N ∈ N, we write z =( x(N),y) to denote the element z ∈ X,
satisfying zk = xk for all k ∈{ 1,..,N} and zM+k = yk for all k ∈ N. If x ∈ X
and
 ∞
n=1 xn < ∞, we deﬁne I(x)=
 ∞
n=1 xn. The unit simplex in X is the
set S = {x ∈ X : I(x)=1 }.
For y,z ∈ RN, we write y ≥ z if yi ≥ zi for all i ∈ N ; and, we write y>z
if y ≥ z, and y  = z. For x,y ∈ X, we will denote (|x1 − y1|,|x2 − y2|,...) ∈
RN
+ by |x − y|.
A social welfare relation (SWR) is a binary relation,  on X ,w h i c hi s
reﬂexive and transitive (a quasi-ordering). We associate with  its symmetric
and asymmetric components in the usual way. Thus, we write x ∼ y when
x  y and y  x both hold; and, we write x   y when x  y holds, but
y  x does not hold. A social welfare ordering (SWO) is a binary relation,
 on X , which is complete4 and transitive (an ordering). Given an ordering
 on X, for each x ∈ X the Lower and Upper Contour Sets are deﬁned as
LC(x)={y ∈ X : x  y} and UC(x)={y ∈ X : y  x} respectively.
2.2 Ethical Preferences
The requirements that we would want any social welfare order  deﬁned on
X to satisfy are the Anonymity and Pareto axioms, which can be stated as
follows.
Axiom 1 (Anonymity) If x,y are in X, and there exist i,j in N , such that
xi = yj and xj = yi , while xk = yk for all k ∈ N , such that k  = i,j ,t h e n
x ∼ y.
Axiom 2 (Pareto) If x,y ∈ X, and x ≥ y, then x  y; further, if x>y ,
then x   y.
The axiom of Anonymity requires an ordering to treat generations equally,
however far out in time they are. The Pareto axiom requires that the ordering
be positively sensitive to each generation’s utility level. A social welfare order
 satisfying the Anonymity and Pareto axioms is called an ethical social
welfare ordering.[ T h et e r methical preferences is used synonymously]. It is
known (see Svensson (1980)) that ethical preferences on X exist.
4Since completeness implies reﬂexivity, a social welfare ordering is a social welfare
relation, which is complete.
42.3 A Class of Metrics and the Continuity Axiom
Unlike the Pareto and Anonymity axioms, any Continuity axiom on X re-
quires one to formalize the notion of utility streams being “close to each
other”. In this subsection, we do this in terms of a metric (the term distance
function is used synonymously); that is, we introduce the Continuity axiom
on a metric space (X,d), where d is a metric from X × X to R+.
We consider the class of metrics which satisfy the following four proper-
ties:
(M.1) If x,y ∈ X, then d(x,y)=d(|x − y|,0).
(M.2) If x,y ∈ X be such that x ≥ y then d(x,0) ≥ d(y,0).
(M.3) If x ∈ X and M ∈ N, then d((0(M),x),0) ≤ d(x,0).
(M.4) If λ
n ∈ [0,1] for n ∈ N, and λ
n → 0 as n →∞then,
d(λ
n(e(M),0[M]),0) → 0 as n →∞for every M ∈ N.
The condition (M.1) requires that the distance between two streams in X
depends only on the component-wise diﬀerences between the streams5.T h e
condition (M.2) is a weak monotonicity property. Condition (M.3) requires
that the distance of a stream from zero does not increase if the stream in
question is shifted forward in time by a ﬁnite number of periods, with the
initial time period components set equal to zero6. Condition (M.4) pertains
to streams converging to zero; it requires that convergence to zero in terms
of d certainly include the case of convergence of any given ﬁnite number of
components to zero (when all other components are ﬁxed at zero).
While conditions (M.1)-(M.4) do impose restrictions on the class of met-
rics studied, it will be noted that the most commonly used metrics in this




(ii) du(x,y)=s u p k∈N |xk − yk|
(iii) dp(x,y)=m i n {1,[
 ∞
k=1 |xk − yk|p](1/p)} forp∈ (1,∞)
(iv) d1(x,y)=m i n {1,
 ∞
k=1 |xk − yk|}
(v) dq(x,y)=m i n {1,
 ∞
k=1 |xk − yk|
q} forq ∈ (0,1)
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
(D)
The distance function dc generates the co-ordinatewise convergence or the
product topology, du the uniform (or sup-norm) topology (both dc and du
were used by Diamond (1965)). The distance function dp generates the
5In particular, this property makes the metric translation invariant:i fx,y ∈ X and
z ∈ RN, such that (x + z),(y + z) ∈ X, then d(x + z,y + z)=d(x,y).
6Note that (M.3) is weaker than requiring shift invariance of the distance.
5bounded  p metric topology (for 1 <p<∞),d 1 the bounded  1 metric
topology (used by Svensson (1980)), and dq the bounded  q metric topology
(for 0 <q<1). The metrics have been listed in the order of the “strength”
of the topologies induced by them, the product topology being the weakest
(among the ﬁve). A weaker topology has fewer open sets, and therefore a
continuity axiom in terms of such a topology is a more demanding axiom.
The class of metrics satisfying (M.1)-(M.4) will be denoted by ∆. Given
a metric d ∈ ∆, one can deﬁne a function f : X → R+ by:
f(x)=d(x,0) forallx∈ X
The function, f, satisﬁes some useful properties7 which we note below:
(F.1) f(x)=0if and only if x =0 .
(F.2) For any x,y ∈ X, with (x + y) ∈ X, we have f(x + y) ≤
f(x)+f(y).
(F.3) For all λ ∈ [0,1] and x ∈ X, f(λx) ≤ f(x).
(F.4) If xn ∈ X for n ∈ N, and f(xn) → 0 as n →∞ , then for every
λ ∈ R+, such that λxn ∈ X for n ∈ N,f (λxn) → 0 as n →∞ .
(F.5) If x ∈ X, and λ
n ∈ [0,1] for n ∈ N, with λ
n → 0 as n →∞ ,
then f(λ
n(x(M),0[M])) → 0 as n →∞ , for every M ∈ N.
Without further mention, all metrics discussed henceforth will be taken
to belong to ∆. We are now ready to state the Continuity axiom.
Axiom 3 (d-Continuity): The set LC(x) is a closed subset of the metric
space (X,d) for every x ∈ X.
Note that the continuity axiom is stated in a weak form: the usual conti-
nuity axiom asserts that both the upper contour set and the lower contour set
of each point x ∈ X is closed (see, for example, Diamond (1965) or Svensson
(1980)).
7The properties make the function, f, behave somewhat like a F-norm. However, f
does not satisfy the following property of F-norms: if x ∈ X, and λ
n ∈ [0,1] for n ∈ N,
with λ
n → 0 as n →∞ , then f(λ
nx) → 0 as n →∞ . For a comprehensive discussion of
F-norms, see Köthe (1969, p.163).
63 The Characterization Result
3.1 Statement and Discussion
In this section, we state and prove our characterization result, which provides
a relatively easy to check condition that is both necessary and suﬃcient for
the Anonymity, Pareto and Continuity axioms to be simultaneously satisﬁed
by any social welfare ordering.
Given any metric d ∈ ∆, we deﬁne the distance between a point ¯ x ∈ X
and a set A ⊂ X in the usual way:
d(¯ x,A)=i n f
x∈A
d(x, ¯ x)
The basic condition involved in the characterization resultc a nn o wb es t a t e d
as follows (recalling that S i st h eu n i ts i m p l e xi nX).
Condition S (Simplex Condition) d(0,S) > 0.
This means that utility sequences lying in the unit simplex of X (and there-
fore bounded away from zero in the bounded  1 metric) must be bounded
away from zero in terms of the chosen metric, d.
Theorem 1 A social welfare ordering  on X can satisfy the Anonymity,
Pareto and d -Continuity axioms simultaneously (where d ∈ ∆) if and only
if d satisﬁes Condition S.
Just as a quick application of this characterization result, it is instructive
to investigate what it implies for the ﬁve distance functions listed in (D)
above. It is known from Diamond (1965) that ethical preferences cannot
satisfy the Continuity axiom in terms of the metrics dc and du, and these
metrics clearly violate Condition S, as they should according to the theorem.
At the other end of the spectrum, it is known from Svensson (1980) that there
exist ethical preferences which are continuous in the metric d1 (and therefore
in any metric, like dq, which induces a stronger topology than d1 does), and
the metrics d1 and dq clearly satisfy Condition S, as they should according
to the theorem. This leaves us with the class of bounded  p metrics (for
1 <p<∞). The literature has little to say about this case. However, these
metrics clearly also violate Condition S, and so we can infer from the theorem
that ethical preferences cannot be continuous in terms of the bounded  p
metrics.
7Actually, it is not a coincidence that Svensson’s bounded  1 metric pro-
vides the appropriate dividing line between possibility and impossibility re-
sults among the metrics listed in (D). In fact, it provides such a dividing line
among all metrics d ∈ ∆, a result which is worth noting formally.
Theorem 2 Among all metrics d ∈ ∆, Svensson’s bounded  1 metric induces
the weakest topology under which there exist continuous ethical preferences.
3.2 Proofs
Before coming to the proofs of the two theorems stated above, we note a
useful lemma, relating the behavior of a metric with respect to the unit
simplex, to its behavior with respect to α -simplexes, where α ∈ (0,1). It is
used in the proofs of both the theorems.
Lemma 1 Let d be a metric in ∆. Then, for each M ∈ N, we have:
d(0,S(1/M)) ≥ d(0,S)/M (1)
where:
S(1/M)={x ∈ X :
∞  
k=1
xk =( 1 /M)} forM ∈ N (2)
Proof. Let M ∈ N be given, and let z be an arbitrary element in S(1/M).
Then, by (2), Mz ∈ X, and by property (F.2), we have f(Mz) ≤ Mf(z).
Also, by (2), Mz ∈ S, and so d(0,S) ≤ f(Mz). Thus, we have f(z) ≥
d(0,S)/M. Since z was an arbitrary element in S(1/M), ( 1 )m u s th o l d .
It is convenient to break up the proof of the characterization result (The-
orem 1) into three steps. First, we follow the technique of Diamond (1965) to
prove the impossibility result. Second, we establish a lemma, which is useful
in addressing the possibility result. Third, we use the lemma and follow the
method of Svensson (1980) to prove the possibility result.
Proposition 1 A social welfare ordering  on X cannot satisfy the Anonymity,
Pareto and d -Continuity axioms simultaneously (where d ∈ ∆) if d violates
Condition S.
8Proof. Suppose, contrary to what has to be proved, that there exists a
SWO  satisfying the Anonymity, Pareto and d-Continuity axioms (where
d ∈ ∆), even though d violates Condition S. Then, there is a sequence
{zN}∞
N=1 with zN ∈ S for all N ∈ N, and d(zN,0) → 0 as N →∞ .







n ≥ [(N − 1)/N] (3)




















Deﬁne x ∈ X as follows:




Similarly, deﬁne ¯ x ∈ X (by replacing the ﬁrst zero in x by 1) as follows:




We now construct a sequence of points (xN), where xN ∈ X for k ∈ N,
such that (i) each xN is indiﬀerent to x, and (ii) xN converges to ¯ x in terms













Note that xN is obtained from x, by interchanging the α(N) appearing as the








By the Anonymity axiom, we must therefore have xN ∼ x for all N ∈ N.
Note that for N ∈ N, we have:
d(x






























9the ﬁrst line in (8) following from (M.1), the second line from (F.2), the third
l i n ef r o m( M . 2 )a n d( 3 ) ,t h ef o u r t hl i n ef r o m( M . 3 ) ,a n dt h el a s tl i n ef r o m
(M.2). Thus, using (M.4), we have:
d(x
N, ¯ x) → 0 as N →∞ (9)
Since xN ∈ LC(x) for all N ∈ N, (9) implies that ¯ x ∈ LC(x), by the d-
Continuity axiom. But, from (5) and (6), it is clear that ¯ x   x by the Pareto
axiom, and this contradiction establishes the result.
Lemma 2 Suppose d ∈ ∆ satisﬁes Condition S. Suppose x ∈ X, and {xN}∞
N=1








   x
N
k − xk
    → 0 as N →∞ (11)
Proof. For each N ∈ N, denote
   xN
k − xk
    by zN
k for all k ∈ N. Suppose,
contrary to the Lemma, that there is M ∈ N and a subsequence of (zN)





n > (1/M) forallN






n ≥ βf o r a l l N (12)
Since Condition S holds, we have:
γ ≡ d(0,S) > 0 (13)
U s i n gL e m m a1a n d( 1 3 ) ,w eo b t a i n :














the ﬁrst line of (15) following from (M.2), the second line from the fact that
(using (12)) for each N ∈ N,β (N) ≥ β, a n d( M . 2 ) ,a n dt h el a s tl i n ef r o mt h e
fact that (using (10) again) for each N ∈ N, (βzN
1 /β(N),...,βzN
k(N)/β(N),0[k(N)]) ∈
S(β), and (14). But this contradicts (10), establishing the result.
Proposition 2 Suppose d ∈ ∆ satisﬁes Condition S. Then, there is a social
welfare ordering  on X, satisfying the Anonymity, Pareto and d -Continuity
axioms simultaneously.
Proof. The social welfare ordering  is speciﬁed exactly along the lines
of Svensson (1980, p.1254-55). We specify it here in terms of slightly diﬀerent
notation.




|xn − yn| < ∞
It can be checked that E is an equivalence relation. Now, let:
X = ∪j∈JXj
be the partition of X in equivalence classes (Xj) corresponding to E. Let M
be a set of representatives, exactly one from each set Xj; thus,
M = {x
j : x
j ∈ Xj,j∈ J}
This can be done by the axiom of choice.
(ii) Deﬁne a relation R  on M as follows:
xR
 yi f ft h e r ei s ¯ N ∈ N,such that
N  
n=1
(xn − yn) ≥ 0 forallN ≥ ¯ N
It can be checked that R  is a quasi-ordering on M.
11(iii) By Szpilrajn’s lemma, there is an ordering R   on M such that R  is
a subrelation to R  .







and deﬁne the relation Rj on Xj by:
xRjyi f fF j(x) ≥ Fj(y)
Clearly, Rj is an ordering on Xj, since Fj is well-deﬁned on Xj.
(v) Deﬁne a relation  on X as follows. If x ∈ Xj and y ∈ Xi,x j,x i ∈ M,
then:
(i) If xjP  xi,t h e nx  y
(ii) If xjI  xi,t h e nx yi f fF j(x) ≥ Fi(y)
One can follow Svensson (1980, p.1255) to check that  is an ordering on
X, which satisﬁes the Anonymity and Pareto axioms.
It remains to check that  satisﬁes the d-Continuity axiom. To this end,
let x,y be points in X, and let (xN) be an arbitrary sequence of points in
LC(y), such that:
d(x
N,x) → 0 as N →∞ (16)
We have to show that y  x. Let x ∈ Xj and let y ∈ Xi. Using Lemma 2





n − xn|→0 as N →∞ (17)
Thus, there is some ˆ N ∈ N, such that xN ∈ Xj for all N ≥ ˆ N. If xjP  xi,
then by deﬁnition of , we must have xN   y for N ≥ ˆ N, which contradicts
the fact that xN ∈ LC(y) for all N ∈ N. Thus, we have xiR  xj.
If xiP  xj, then by deﬁnition of , we have y   x. Thus, it only remains
to examine the case in which xiI  xj. Since xN ∈ Xj for all N ≥ ˆ N and
y ∈ Xi, and xN ∈ LC(y) for all N ∈ N, we must have by deﬁnition of ,
Fj(x
N) ≤ Fi(y) forallN ≥ ˆ N (18)
12T h u s ,w eh a v ef o rN ≥ ˆ N :
















the inequality in the third line of (19) following from (18). Now, using (17),
we obtain:
Fj(x) ≤ Fi(y)
Thus, y  x by deﬁnition of , establishing the result.
The proof of the second theorem uses Lemma 1 to establish a proposition
(Proposition 3) which shows that the topology induced by any metric d ∈ ∆,
satisfying the simplex condition, is stronger than the topology induced by
the bounded  1 metric. Theorem 2 follows directly from the characterization
result in Theorem 1 and this proposition.
Proposition 3 Let d1 denote the bounded  1 metric. Let d ∈ ∆ be any
metric satisfying Condition S. Then the topology induced by d is stronger
than the topology induced by d1.
Proof. Let x ∈ X and ε>0 be given. We have to show that there is
δ>0 such that:
Bd(x,δ) ⊂ Bd1(x,ε) (20)
where Bd(x,δ) is the open ball with center x and radius δ in terms of the
metric d, and Bd1(x,ε) is the open ball with center x and radius ε in terms of
the metric d1. [Note that, when (20) is valid, every open set in the d1 metric
topology is also open in the d metric topology].
Denote d(0,S) by θ. Since d ∈ ∆ satisﬁes Condition S, we know that
θ>0. Choose N ∈ N such that (1/N) <ε .Then, choose δ>0 such that
δ<(θ/N).
Let y ∈ Bd(x,δ). We ﬁrst establish that:
∞  
k=1
|xk − yk| < ∞ (21)
13Suppose that (21) is violated. Then, one can choose n ∈ N, such that:
n  
k=1
|xk − yk| > 1





|xk − zk| =
n  
k=1
|xk − yk| > 1 (22)
Further, we have d(x,y)=d(|x − y|,0) ≥ d(|x − z|,0) = f(|x − z|) ≥
f((1/A)|x − z|)=d((1/A)|x − z|,0) ≥ θ, since (1/A)|x − z|∈S, using (22).
But, since y ∈ Bd(x,δ), we have d(x,y) <δ .Thus, we must have δ>θ ,which
contradicts our choice of δ, and establishes the validity of (21). Denote the
sum in (21) by C.
If C =0 , then y = x, and so y ∈ Bd1(x,ε), establishing (20). Thus, the
only non-trivial case to consider is where C>0. We claim that C<ε .For,
if C ≥ ε, we have:
d(|x − y|,0) ≥ d([(1/N)/C]|x − y|,0) (23)
since (1/N) <ε≤ C. Clearly, [(1/N)/C]|x−y|∈S(1/N), a n ds ob yL e m m a
1, we have:
d([(1/N)/C]|x − y|,0) ≥ (θ/N) (24)
Combining (23) and (24), we have d(|x − y|,0) ≥ (θ/N). But, since y ∈
Bd(x,δ), we have d(x,y) <δ .Thus, we get δ>(θ/N), a contradiction. This
establishes our claim that C<ε .Thus, by (21), and the deﬁnition of the
bounded  1 metric, we have d1(x,y) <ε ,so that y ∈ Bd1(x,ε), establishing
(20).
4 Concluding Remarks
We conclude with a couple of observations. First, the scope of our two main
results (Theorems 1 and 2) are restricted to the class of metrics, satisfying
conditions (M.1)-(M.4). Of these, (M.1), (M.2) and (M.4) appear to be
very natural restrictions in this context. Condition (M.3), relating to shifts
in time, is somewhat less obvious, although it is satisﬁed by a number of
metrics, used in this literature. It is possible that (M.3) can be weakened
14somewhat, while preserving the results of the paper. This is left as an open
question.
Second, there appears to be a close connection between the problem of
characterization of metrics under which ethical preferences can be continu-
ous, and the problem of characterization of metrics such that every Paretian
and continuous social welfare ordering can be represented by a social wel-
fare function. The connection can be seen informally as follows: we know
from Basu and Mitra (2003) that there is no social welfare function which
simultaneously satisﬁes the Anonymity and Pareto axioms. Thus, when the
continuity requirement is strong (as in the sup-metric continuity of Diamond
(1965)), every Paretian and continuous social welfare ordering can be repre-
sented by a social welfare function, so that by the Basu-Mitra result, Pareto,
Anonymity and sup-metric Continuity cannot be simultaneously satisﬁed by
any social welfare ordering (which is Diamond’s result). On the other hand,
when the continuity requirement is weak (as in the bounded  1 metric con-
tinuity of Svensson (1980)), we know that Pareto, Anonymity and  1 metric
Continuity can be simultaneously satisﬁed by the social welfare order con-
structed by Svensson, so that by the Basu-Mitra result, such a social welfare
order cannot be represented by a social welfare function. It would be useful
to explore more formally the connection between the two problems.
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